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Abstract
In this paper an agent-based model (abm) will be used to study the ef-
fects of enforcement policy in Italy: d.lgs. 124/2004. Three kinds of policy
will be tested in the model: control, sanction and legitimacy-regulation.
The first policy is based on the number of inspectors present in the econ-
omy; the second is defined by the magnitude of punishment; the third is
measured by the social legitimacy of regulation. This simulation has pro-
duced a number of results, the most important of which are: the negligible
influence of control increasing to enforce irregularity; the strong influence
of the level of punishment on the irregularity ratio in all Italian areas;
the good political choice to increase the social legitimacy to regulation in
promoting regularity.
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1 Introduction
Strategies to combat underground economy have become a priority issue on the
European political agenda over the last few years. The European Commission
[1998] proposed a formal document, on underground economy and off-the-books
employment, to all the member countries. The main objectives of this document
were, on the one hand, the need of liberalizing the labour market, reducing fiscal
pressure and simplifing the tax system; on the other hand, an urge to increasing
control on regularity and respect for the institutions.
For an optimal mix of policies the European Commission recommended the
following points:
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i) a change in the fiscal and regulatory system; for instance, a greater flexi-
bility of the labour market, a simpler and lighter tax system, a reduction in the
cost of labour;
ii) a more effective enforcement of the system, through a more intense control
activity and an increase in the severity of sanctions;
iii) a change in behaviour and attitudes, through a progressive spread of
fiscal morality and loyalty in the institutions.
Only a few countries, however, adopted an integrated policy of interven-
tion. In Italy, for instance, the only policies adopted were those concerning
incentive, with greater flexibility of the labour market regulations and fiscal
benefits. Two instruments in particular have been adopted over recent years:
realignment contracts in the law n.196/1997 and the Program for emersion in
the law n. 383/2001. These interventions were characterized by tax incentives,
deregulation of production activities, bonuses paid for cancellation of previous
tax debts, etc., without any enforcement action taking place at the same time.
The failure of the last Program for emersion is showed in the data of Labour
Minister: only 3854 irregular workers emerged that are about the 0.0008% of
the 3.5 millions of irregular workers in Italy!
An explanation of this failure is based on the low investment in control and
punishment policy. In reality, some controls’ improvements were made at the
end of 1997, but there was a progressive reduction of inspections during 1998-
2001 period (graphic 1).
Graphic 1: number of inspections in Italy (years 1997-2001). Source: Ministry
of Labour.
Much debate exists in traditional literature [Ihrig J., Moe K.S. 2004; John-
son, Simon, et alt. 1998] about the results of the policies adopted and the main
causes of their failure. In particular, in Ihrig J. and Moe K.S., the results sug-
gest that only incentive policy combined with increased enforcement reduce the
size of the irregular sector. Some international empirical evidence1 shows that
1There are a few proxies used in the literature to measure enforcement. In this example
we used the International Financial Statistics data.
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the countries with high enforcement tend to have smaller informal sectors and
viceversa (graphic 2).
Graphic 2: size of informal sector vs. enforcement. Source: Intenational
Financial Statistics.
In the light of previous failures and the empirical evidence that shows an
increasing level of irregularity ratio in the Centre-South italian regions (table
1); a new policy was introduced in Italy in 2003 with the Biagi law reforming
the labour market. In particular, by means the d.lgs. n. 124/2004 a new
enforcement approach was adopted against the underground economy. Following
the UE directive, an increase in the level of control and the social promotion of
regulation legitimacy are proposed as the main instruments.
Regions 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
North-west 11.3 11.3 11.2 11.2 11.1 10.8
North-east 11.2 11.1 11.1 11.2 10.9 11.3
Centre 14.2 14.2 14.8 15.0 15.2 15.4
South 20.7 20.9 21.6 22.3 22.6 22.4
Total Italy 14.5 14.5 14.8 15.1 15.0 15.0
Table 1: irregular employment years 1995-2000 for regions. Source: Istat
The debate, in Italy, about this policy has influenced the present work. Many
lawyers [Monticelli, Tiraboschi 2004; Scarpelli F. 2004], have analysed some legal
inconsistencies of the device. In particular, the reform provides for an increase of
inspection activity, of promotion of legality but, at the same time, an unjustified
reduction of punishment level2. The aim of this paper is to analyse the different
2This result is contained in two devices: the conciliazione monocratica (art.11), and the
diffida (art.13).
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effects of this reform on the size of irregular sector, distinguishing the policy
intervention for the different italian regions.
By means of a simulation model3 I propose to explain how the different policy
devices could influence the irregularity ratio in the economy. In particular, I
put to the test a control policy based on the number of inspectors present in the
economy, an enforcement policy based on the severity of sanctions, and, finally,
a policy based on the level of social legitimacy of regulation.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I describe the common frame-
work of the economic literature about the informal activity. Section 3 describes
the agent-based model and its characteristics. In section 4 I present the analy-
sis of policy interventions and their effects on regional irregular ratio. Section 5
concludes.
2 A framework for irregular behaviour
Economic literature on underground economy is based on a cost-benefit analysis
of individual behaviour. Generally, it represents the firm’s choice to operate on
an underground basis or in a regular economy, and how governments can fight
the phenomenon effectively.
The literature offers two explanations of why firms choose the underground
sector, which, while not mutually exclusive, have distinct policy implications.
First, firms may go underground when statutory tax rates are high and other
official regulations are onerous [De Soto 1989; Schneider and Enste 2000]. Cut-
ting taxes and a process of deregulation are, according to this view, the main
ways to bring firms into the official economy. Second, the underground economy
may be due primarily to predatory behavior by government officials [Kaufmann
1994; Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton 1998]. In this view the problem
that needs to be addressed is bureaucratic corruption.
For all these explanations there is a common simple approach: firm receives
an economic benefit from irregularity. A reduction in taxation, lower production
costs and more flexibility in the labour market represent some of these benefits.
Every firm compares the benefits of irregular activity with the corresponding
expected costs. The costs of irregularity depend on the punishment level and
the probability of sanctions.
This simple outline represents the theoretical foundation of two alternative
policies for government intevention. It is possible to introduce a policy that
reduces the benefits of irregular activity, and/or a policy that increases the
expected costs. The choice of the better policy mix depends on the level of the
resources locally needed for vigilance.
3The simulation is written in NetLogo. The code is available from the author upon request.
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3 Model and analysis
Risk-adverse firms do business in a local economy system and might decide
to violate the official regulation and operate in the irregular economy. The
decision depends on the benefits that they would obtain from doing so and the
probability and magnitude of sanctions they would face for the violation. In
particular, we assume that every firm has an individual level of benefit (b) with
respect to irregular activity. The benefit is defined by two variables: subjective
and objective. The subjective cost’s variable (h), measures the firm’s internal
costs of regulation. The other objective variable is determined globally (i.e. is
equal for all firms) and measures the level of social legitimacy of regulation (l).
The individual level of b is reduced by the number of inspectors in the individual
neighborhood and the magnitude of punishment.
The firm’s benefit level will be:
b = [h× (1− l)]− [punish+ (inspectors− on− neighbourhood)÷ 100]
where:
h ∈ [0, 1], firm’s costs;
l ∈ [0, 1], social legitimacy of regulation (regulation− legitimacy);
punish ≥ 0, magnitude of punishment;
inspectors− on−neighbourhood, number of inspectors in the firm’s neigh-
bourhood.
Each firm calculates the probability of being sanctioned in every period.
The probability depends on the number of inspectors and of irregular firms in
its neighbourhood.
Every firm calculates this value, as below:
pi = 1− exp [−K? ( IF )]
where:
I is the number of inspectors in the neighbourhood;
F is the number of irregular firms in the neighbourhood;
K? is a constant that ensures a reasonable value with only one inspector
and one firm.
In each period, every firm calculates the risk of its irregular activity. The
risk is the product of the probability of punishment (pi) and the individual
risk − aversion.
It will be:
risk = pi × r
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where:
r ∈ [0, 1], is the firm’s risk-aversion.
The behaviour of firms is determined by the difference between the benefit
and the risk of irregular activity. If the difference between the individual ben-
efit (b) and the risk is positive, the firm will become irregular, and viceversa,
if the difference is negative, it will operate in the regular economy. For every
period each firm can redefine its position, passing from a regular position to an
irregular one.
b− risk > 0⇒ irregular
b− risk ≤ 0⇒ regular
An independent population of inspectors, with very simple characteristics,
moves around at random, seeking for irregular firms in his or her neighbourhood.
In each run, the inspector will randomly select an irregular firm for punishment.
The sanction magnitude is defined by the punish, representing a temporary
monetary fee to pay. At the end of the sanction time the firm will go back into
a regular economy4.
4 Policy analysis
In this section, some of the enforcement policies have been tested. In Italy, the
recent labour market reform (Biagi law) is based on the following points:
1. an increase in the legitimacy of social regulation;
2. an increase in control policies;
3. a decrease in the level of sanction policies.
The traditional litterature about the optimal enforcement policy [Becker
1968; Shavell, 1993; Mitchell Polinsky, Shavell, 2000], represents the theoretical
foundation that points out the contradictory choice of this reform: it does not
represent the best way to prevent irregular economy, above all because it reduces
the sanctions for irregular firms, while increasing the resources for control activ-
ities. For instance, Becker has shown that, from the social welfare standpoint,
it is always optimal to substitute a higher sanction for a lower control level,
and that punishment should be optimally set at its maximum level. The results
of tests confirm this critical judgement and the inconsistent political choice of
reducing the level of sanctions, showing, on the contrary, that it represents the
best instrument to enforce the irregularity. The next section illustrates the
results of the policies of control, sanctions and social legitimacy of regulation.
The empirical starting point of this analysis is shown by the following italian
regional situation. I will distinguish three different situations for each areas:
4The structure of agent-based model is made up as in A appendix.
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North, Centre and South. Three areas are distinguished for the control ratio
(number of inspectors/firms)5, irregularity and social legitimacy to regulation
(regulation legitimacy). The following table 2 shows the benchmark situation
for each regional area.
Regions irregularity(%) control ratio regulation legitimacy*
North 11.0 .1239 .83
Centre 15.4 .2176 .82
South 22.4 .2033 .80
Table 2: regional conditions (benchmark)
* it was indirectly set, given the irregularity(%), the control, and the same
level of punish
4.1 The increasing of the number of inspectors.
The first policy in the reform (d.lgs.124/04) consists in a more efficient inspec-
tion activity. In particular, an increase in the presence of inspectors in the
economy is the main purpose of the policy. In the model, this intervention is
defined by the number of inspectors (inspector-density), and how this policy
effects on the irregular ratio for each region.
The test simulates the effects of an increase in the number of inspectors on
the ratio of regularity. The following graphic 3 shows the reduction of irregu-
larity in the different regions for a progressive increasing (+25%) of the number
of inspectors.
Graphic 3: irregularity ratio for increasing levels (+25%) of the inspectors.
5see table 6 in B appendix.
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The simulation shows low effects for all the regions. Infact, an increasing of
25% of inspectors does not reduce the irregularity ratio. South is the area in
which the control policy is more effective. It is possible to notice a reduction of
-4,15% of the irregulatity ratio but with a too much expensive increasing of the
number of inspectors of 100%. In the Centre and in the North the effects are
very small. Briefly, for all italian regions, the simulation points out to avoid the
use of control policy to enforce the irregular sector.
.25 .5 .75 100
North - +0.26 +0.31 -1.02
Centre - -1.21 -1.24 -1.86
South - -2.37 -2.01 -4.15
Table 3: Percentage variation of irregularity for increasing number of
inspectors
This result suggests that it is advisable to avoid an exclusive control policy,
and to contain investments in this direction. It is important to note that control
policies are generally very expensive for administrations and their use should
therefore be limited.
4.2 The magnitude of sanctions
The second instrument of enforcement consists in the severity of sanctions for
irregular activity. The Italian labor market reform neglected this aspect, which
nevertheless represents one of the most important expected costs for irregular
firms. In practice, the severity level of punishment has been reduced in the
reform. This omission is not supported by the results of the simulation; the tests
confirm, in fact, a negative causal correlation between the level of punishment
and the ratio of irregularity.
In the model, the magnitude of punishment is progressively increased (+4%)
for all regions, until its double value (+100%); the following graphic 4 shows
the results of the test.
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Graphic 4: irregularity ratio for increasing magnitude of punishment (+4%).
The results show a positive effect on the ratio of irregularity with just little
increasing of sanctions. With an increase of +20% of sanctions it can be observed
a reduction of irregularity of -5,98% in the North, -4,38% in the Centre and -
6,64% in the South. It is important to note that we will might observe a total
cancellation of irregularity for a increasing of sanctions of +44% in the North,
+64% in the Centre and +100% in the South!
We summarize the results in the following table 4.
.20 .32 .44 .64 100
North -5,98 -9,34 setting to zero
Centre -4,38 -6,82 setting to zero
South -6,64 -8,61 setting to zero
Table 4: reduction of irregularity for increasing levels of punishment.
The results imply a policy recommendation: an increase in the punishment
level is a good instrument for the prevention of irregular economies even with
small increase. Considering that punishment policies do not imply any admin-
istrative investment, it can be concluded that it would be a good thing to set
the sanctions level at its maximum.
4.3 The increasing social legitimacy
It is very difficult to define a direct correspondence between intervention policies
and the social level of regulation legitimacy. In this work, regulation legitimacy
was adopted as an index of the policy of promotion and diffusion of legality. The
simulation results showed a strong causal dependence between social legitimacy
and the irregularity ratio of the economy.
Starting from the benchmark levels for each area I increased the legitimacy
level of small percentage (+1%). The simulation data show that with just a small
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increasing of legitimacy the irregularity ratio is reduced to nil. The following
graphic 5 shows the results of the test.
Graphic 5: irregularity ratio Vs. a percentage increasing (+1%) of social
legitimacy.
For all three areas the increasing in social legitimacy shows a very strong
effect on the irregularity ratio. It needed an increase of about 3% to wipe off
entirely the irregularity in the Centre and in North areas; and an increase of
5,5% for the South.
5 Conclusion
How does the italian labour market reform (Biagi) affect the irregular sector in
the italian regions? What is the best policy mix to enforce the irregularity? In
this paper, the effects of enforcement policies have been studied in a simulated
underground economy. The analysis confirmed the common opinion regarding
the ineffectiveness of enforcement policies when they are not accompanied by
an activity of promotion of social legality. The last test showed the strong
effectiveness of the social legitimacy on the irregularity, but it is not easy to
settle. Enforcement policies represent a necessary support for the prevention of
underground economy, but they are not able alone to rule out irregularity.
The choice to increasing the control policy is not supported by the simulation
results. The results imply a limited use of this policy, because it needed a very
expensive administrative investment compared to the low effects on irregular
sector. In the best case, i.e. the South, it is necessary an increase of 100% of
the inspectors number to reduce the irregularity by 4%!
In the light of previous results, the Italian labour market reform (n.124/2004)
shows some inefficiencies. With the exception of the promotion of social legiti-
macy policy, in particular, there is no advantage in reducing the magnitude of
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punishment, because this represents a cheap and effective policy for the pre-
vention of underground economy. In all regions this device, consistent with the
literature, showed a strong effectiveness on the irregularity ratio. We observed
that an increase of 30% of magnitude will reduce of about 10% the irregularity
in all regions.
Appendix
A. The simulation
The simulation is constructed as follows. At t = 0 N regular firms are created.
An indipendent population of I inspectors randomly looking for irregular firms.
At the start of every period all firms compared the benefits with the costs of
irregularity and choice the sector in which operate. Firms that have chosen
the irregular sector can be sanctioned by inspectors. The sequence of events is
reported in the following table.
Order Time Who What
1 0 Model Create firms
2 0 Model Create inspectors
3 1 Firms Choice sector
4 2 Inspectors Enforce
Table 5: Sequence of events
A typical simulation run lasts for about 1000 periods. The simulation is
written in NetLogo (http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/), the code is available
from the author upon request.
B. Tables
Regions inspectors firms Inspectors/firms%
North 2670 2154484 .123928
Centre 1947 894724 .217609
South 2412 1186177 .203342
Total Italy 7029 4235385 .165959
Table 6:
Number of inspectors, with new assumptions in 2005. Source: Ministry of
Labour.
Number of firms for regions. Source: Istat 2003.
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